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25 February 1960

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED] Acting Director of Security

SUBJECT : Revision of DCID No. 11/2

REFERENCE : Supplementary Memo dated 4 February 1960

1. It seems to me that a paragraph along the general lines of proposed paragraph d. covering "sensitive intelligence sources" would serve a useful purpose as regards sensitive intelligence not classified as "special."

2. I am not clear, however, whether paragraph 7. of the draft DCID is intended to make all the proposed supplementary classifications non-applicable to "special" intelligence (and atomic energy intelligence) or not. It says they do not "supersede nor affect" the special controls already in effect for such intelligence. But surely this does not imply they may not properly be additive as controls. For example, classifications such as NO DISSEMINATION ABROAD could surely be an appropriate additional control on certain code-word intelligence.

3. It appears to me that disclosure of certain types of "sensitive intelligence" -- including certain special intelligence -- almost automatically suggests and thus jeopardizes the source, whether or not the source is specifically indicated. That is, information about certain Soviet activities (if made public) automatically tends to suggest the source from which it must have been acquired, no matter how sanitized by removing specific indicators such as time, date, place of occurrence, etc., as provided in the last part of the proposed paragraph d. [REDACTED]

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At the very least, special competence and ingenuity would need to be exercised in "sanitizing" such subjects, and it should not be permissive for recipients to do this on their own responsibility.

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4. This suggests the possible need for a different sub-category, such as perhaps -- "SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SUBJECT -- CONTINUED CONTROL NECESSARY." The intent would be that information of this type would never be passed on except with a continuing warning. If it were determined that any such information were to be made public, then very special stipulated procedures ought to be followed. The ordinary recipient of the information should not be authorized to sanitize and release.

5. Since a number of problems of concept and wording have been raised by different CIA recipients of these last drafts, I am wondering if you might not make progress faster in a small get-together of those of us who have made suggestions.

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Assistant to the
Deputy Director (Coordination)

cc: [REDACTED]